If a person's thought process went something like this: Observation (observe the enemy and build a potential for action), Orientation (position yourself to an advantage), Decision (build a decision based on your orientation) , and Action (drop the hammer of your decision), (OODA loop borrowed from Col. Boyd), then the generations of warfare (GW) are wedged inside these stopping points of our thought process.
First Generation warfare (1GW) is fought within our Action process, 2GW is inside our Decision making process, 3GW is fought between our Orientation and Decision making process, 4GW is fought within our Orientation, and 5GW is fought within our Observations. I suppose they are called generations of warfare because they move from the simple to the complex, which is how generations are presumed to move.
The Mumbai attacks were 3GW. These tactics were probably observed from the actions of the US military in its invasion of Iraq and with the understanding of what the information age is all about.
Of course these (3GW) are old tactics that were perfected by the German military in WWII. 3GW requires a high degree of strategic information, which nation-state armies usually perform quite messily. This messiness can be seen in how the US military handled the first days of the Iraqi invasion, at least human inteligence wise.
Non-state actors have a distinct advantage in 3GW. It is a very old warfare and they can take the 6 to 9 months as needed and collect all the information from within that will lead to a successful 3GW attack from without. This is especially true, if their goal is to terrorize, get in between ones enemies' orientation and decision making process, and not to hold ground. Holding ground is a concept that non-state actor, do not have much use for. Non-state actors are a part of the whole, not a part of an orientation. They are gamers, not the people who write the game. That part is within the whole of a superorganism.
In fact, much of 3GW is not about holding ground, but isolating orientations and disrupting the decision making process in and between orientations. 3GW is about attacking the logic (command and control)and ethics (internal force) by disrupting the enemies command of its decisions and its ability to control its internal forces.
On the other hand, 4GW is mostly about attacking the logic of a system through the orientation's subversion of its decisions and the observation of its environment. The 4GW warrior attacks the orientation by influencing the image that the orientation sees and thereby changing the decisions that the orientation makes.
3GW warriors isolate the orientations (hotels, Jewish centers, and other centers of gravities) and cut-off the decision making process between orientations (head and body). The goal is to destroy the orientation and make it a part of the whole. This is unlike a 4GW warriors goal. A 4GW warrior does not want to destroy the orientation; it wants to make the orientation its own.
To combat 3GW the government of India needs to concentrate less on the orientations that are behind the attacks and become more proactive, as the US military has done to combat AQ. The India military and police need to observe the information gatherers and strike every 3 or 4 months in every which way, as their ethics allow. The key is information gathering and those who gather the information. Also the decision making process needs to be in a steady state of growth. The gap between decisions and actions need to be in a constant state of change, while the speed of decisions increase. The orientation of the India military and police need to change command and control constantly, but not at a constant rate. Stir the pot, while not weakening the internal force of the nation, the force between the people of India.